Kerberoast
Kerberoast
The goal of Kerberoasting is to harvest TGS tickets for services that run on behalf of user accounts in the AD, not computer accounts. Thus, part of these TGS tickets are encrypted with keys derived from user passwords. As a consequence, their credentials could be cracked offline. You can know that a user account is being used as a service because the property "ServicePrincipalName" is not null.
Therefore, to perform Kerberoasting, only a domain account that can request for TGSs is necessary, which is anyone since no special privileges are required.
You need valid credentials inside the domain.
Cracking
Persistence
If you have enough permissions over a user you can make it kerberoastable:
You can find useful tools for kerberoast attacks here: https://github.com/nidem/kerberoast
If you find this error from Linux: Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great)
it because of your local time, you need to synchronise the host with the DC: ntpdate <IP of DC>
Mitigation
Kerberoast is very stealthy if exploitable
Security Event ID 4769 – A Kerberos ticket was requested
Since 4769 is very frequent, lets filter the results:
Service name should not be krbtgt
Service name does not end with $ (to filter out machine accounts used for services)
Account name should not be machine@domain (to filter out requests from machines)
Failure code is '0x0' (to filter out failures, 0x0 is success)
Most importantly, ticket encryption type is 0x17
Mitigation:
Service Account Passwords should be hard to guess (greater than 25 characters)
Use Managed Service Accounts (Automatic change of password periodically and delegated SPN Management)
More information about Kerberoasting in ired.team in here and here.
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