AppArmor
Basic Information
AppArmor is a kernel enhancement to confine programs to a limited set of resources. It's a Mandatory Access Control or MAC that binds access control attributes to programs rather than to users. AppArmor confinement is provided via profiles loaded into the kernel, typically on boot. AppArmor profiles can be in one of two modes:
Enforcement: Profiles loaded in enforcement mode will result in enforcement of the policy defined in the profile as well as reporting policy violation attempts (either via syslog or auditd).
Complain: Profiles in complain mode will not enforce policy but instead report policy violation attempts.
AppArmor differs from some other MAC systems on Linux: it is path-based, it allows mixing of enforcement and complain mode profiles, it uses include files to ease development, and it has a far lower barrier to entry than other popular MAC systems.
Parts of AppArmor
Kernel module: Does the actual work
Policies: Defines the behaviour and containment
Parser: Loads the policies into kernel
Utilities: Usermode programs to interact with apparmor
Profiles path
Apparmor profiles are usually saved in /etc/apparmor.d/
With sudo aa-status
you will be able to list the binaries that are restricted by some profile. If you can change the char "/" for a dot of the path of each listed binary and you will obtain the name of the apparmor profile inside the mentioned folder.
For example, a apparmor profile for /usr/bin/man will be located in /etc/apparmor.d/usr.bin.man
Commands
Creating a profile
In order to indicate the affected executable, absolute paths and wildcards are allowed (for file globbing) for specifying files.
To indicate the access the binary will have over files the following access controls can be used:
r (read)
w (write)
m (memory map as executable)
k (file locking)
l (creation hard links)
ix (to execute another program with the new program inheriting policy)
Px (execute under another profile, after cleaning the environment)
Cx (execute under a child profile, after cleaning the environment)
Ux (execute unconfined, after cleaning the environment)
Variables can be defined in the profiles and can be manipulated from outside the profile. For example: @{PROC} and @{HOME} (add #include <tunables/global> to the profile file)
Deny rules are supported to override allow rules.
aa-genprof
To easily start creating a profile apparmor can help you. It's possible to make apparmor inspect the actions performed by a binary and then let you decide which actions you want to allow or deny. You just need to run:
Then, in a different console perform all the actions that the binary will usually perform:
Then, in the first console press "s" and then in the recorded actions indicate if you want to ignore, allow, or whatever. When you have finished press "f" and the new profile will be created in /etc/apparmor.d/path.to.binary
Using the arrow keys you can select what you want to allow/deny/whatever
aa-easyprof
You can also create a template of an apparmor profile of a binary with:
Note that by default in a created profile nothing is allowed, so everything is denied. You will need to add lines like /etc/passwd r,
to allow the binary read /etc/passwd
for example.
You can then enforce the new profile with
Modifying a profile from logs
The following tool will read the logs and ask the user if he wants to permit some of the detected forbidden actions:
Using the arrow keys you can select what you want to allow/deny/whatever
Managing a Profile
Logs
Example of AUDIT and DENIED logs from /var/log/audit/audit.log of the executable service_bin
:
You can also get this information using:
Apparmor in Docker
Note how the profile docker-profile of docker is loaded by default:
By default Apparmor docker-default profile is generated from https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/master/profiles/apparmor/template.go
docker-default profile Summary:
Access to all networking
No capability is defined (However, some capabilities will come from including basic base rules i.e. #include <abstractions/base> )
Writing to any /proc file is not allowed
Other subdirectories/files of /proc and /sys are denied read/write/lock/link/execute access
Mount is not allowed
Ptrace can only be run on a process that is confined by same apparmor profile
Once you run a docker container you should see the following output:
Note that apparmor will even block capabilities privileges granted to the container by default. For example, it will be able to block permission to write inside /proc even if the SYS_ADMIN capability is granted because by default docker apparmor profile denies this access:
You need to disable apparmor to bypass its restrictions:
Note that by default AppArmor will also forbid the container to mount folders from the inside even with SYS_ADMIN capability.
Usually, when you find that you have a privileged capability available inside a docker container but some part of the exploit isn't working, this will be because docker apparmor will be preventing it.
AppArmor Docker breakout
You can find which apparmor profile is running a container using:
Then, you can run the following line to find the exact profile being used:
In the weird case you can modify the apparmor docker profile and reload it. You could remove the restrictions and "bypass" them.
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